Governments' revenues are lower when multinational enterprises avoid paying corporate income taxes through shifting their profits to tax havens. Our main research question in this paper is which countries' tax revenues are affected the most and how much. To estimate the scale of profit shifting we start by observing that the higher is the share of investment from offshore financial centres, the lower is the reported rate of return on inward foreign direct investment. Similarly to a recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's report, we assume that the rate of return is lower due to profit shifting. For the first time, we provide illustrative country-level estimates of profit shifting related to foreign direct investment which enables us to study the impact on individual countries' government revenues as well as groups of countries. We find that on average OECD countries lose least and middleincome countries most corporate tax revenue relative to the size of their economies (and their corporate tax revenues and tax revenues). We conclude that profit shifting thus deepens the existing income inequalities and the differences in government revenues between countries. Furthermore, we compare our results with three other recent studies that use different methodologies but also arrive at the countrylevel estimates of tax revenue losses due to profit shifting. In a first such comparison made, we reveal that every study identifies substantial differences across income groups, but the nature of these differences varies across the four studies. Most of the estimates point to developed countries, especially those in OECD, losing less and to developing countries, especially those with middle income, losing more on average.
Introduction
Governments' revenues are lower when multinational enterprises avoid paying corporate income taxes through shifting their profits to tax havens. Profit shifting and tax havens represent a crucial issue for the world economy and, as we show in this paper's conservative estimates, around 250 billion USD worldwide in profits from foreign direct investment may be shifted to tax havens. While being lower than some previous estimates, this still amounts to almost half per cent of world's GDP and for some countries the profits shifted are estimated to be as much as 5 per cent of their GDP. This implies a global estimate of tax revenue lost due to profit shifting of around 70 billion USD. Our methodology enables us to go beyond these global figures and we present estimates of the scale of profit shifting for each individual country. We find these county-level estimates of tax losses to be negatively correlated with GDP per capita and, while the estimated dollar loss is relatively evenly divided between developing and developed countries, the developing ones incur higher losses relative to their economic size.
Tax havens and profit shifting of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have recently been receiving increasing attention from the media, policymakers and academics alike, as documented by the recent studies cited in this paper. The reason seems to be that recently it has become easy for MNEs to avoid paying corporate tax, but also, more recently, relatively easy for the public to see it and for the researchers to provide evidence of it. Despite this, the exact scale of tax losses remains uncertain due to inherent difficulties of estimating tax avoidance and due to gaps in the availability of relevant data, some of which are being addressed by recent EU's or OECD's proposals and some of which are being overcome by innovative researchers. For example, Habu (2017) uses the United Kingdom's confidential corporate tax returns to learn how aggressive are foreign multinational companies in reducing their corporation tax liability, whereas Alstadsaeter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2017) use audits and leaked data from offshore financial institutions to study tax evasion by wealthy individuals. While these studies provide rigorous evidence, they are limited in their scope and provide estimates for one or a few countries.
We, in contrast, aim to provide estimates of profit shifting scale and tax implications for as many countries as possible, which naturally requires us to trade off the much better scope for rigorousness to some extent. Specifically, we aim to estimate the scale of profit shifting and tax revenue losses related to foreign direct investment (FDI). Our two most important data sources are the IMF's Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, which contains country-by-country bilateral FDI data for around 100 countries between the years 2009 and 2015, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) FDI unilateral database with an even wider coverage. We begin by observing that a higher share of investment from offshore financial centres is associated with a lower reported rate of return on inward FDI. We assume, in line with a report of UNCTAD (2015) , that this is due to profit shifting and estimate its scale and the resulting tax revenue losses. For the first time, we provide detailed country-level estimates of profit shifting related to FDI and this enables us to study the impact on individual countries' government revenues. In this paper, we thus use an established data sources of foreign direct investment statistics in combination with a recently released government revenue dataset and other data sources to estimate the scale of profit shifting in a novel way to arrive at country-level estimates. Indeed which countries' tax revenues are affected most is our main research question.
We estimate tax revenue losses at the country level to understand who is losing and who is gaining the most from the current practice of international corporate tax avoidance. For example, are all developing countries or all European Union members losing tax revenue? Are the estimates consistent with the notion that, for example, Mauritius or Luxembourg exploit the current international tax system loopholes at the expense of Mozambique or Latvia? In line with some previous studies, we find that lower-income countries lose more corporate tax revenue than higher-income countries relative to their gross domestic products or their government revenues. We conclude that profit shifting thus deepens the existing income inequalities and the differences in government revenues between countries. We further reinforce our conclusions by making comparisons with three other similar studies with countrylevel tax revenue loss estimates. Specifically, we compare our estimates with perhaps the most comprehensive study of the global losses due to base erosion and profit shifting by IMF's Crivelli et al. (2015) , as re-estimated by Cobham & Janský (2017a) with country-level results, and with the results of Cobham & Janský (2017b) , who estimate for US-headquartered MNEs how much additional tax payments countries would collect if MNEs' reported profits were fully aligned with their economic activity. The fourth source of profit shifting estimates is Clausing (2016) , with main results for the United States, but a speculative extension to a number of the big economies worldwide. Across the four methodological approaches and sets of estimates, we establish characteristics that are associated with countries being more likely to suffer from higher losses due to tax havens. The paper's empirical contribution is presented in the following four stages. First, using new and updated data sources, we re-estimate and critically review the work of UNCTAD (2015) in what we call the baseline model. Second, we develop an extended model and improve on the baseline model in a number of aspects. Third, for the first time, we provide country-level results of the estimated tax revenue losses and discuss the distributional impact of corporate profit shifting. Fourth, we compare our results with three other similar studies with country-level tax revenue loss estimates. These four specific stages altogether contribute to the expanding body of literature on profit shifting and tax havens. There are at least two specific areas in which we make a contribution to the existing research. First, we contribute to the ongoing collective attempt to arrive at estimates of the scale of profit shifting. Despite the inherent difficulties in such estimation, discussed for example by Fuest and Riedel (2012) , a growing number of studies do make credible estimates of the scale of profit shifting, as our literature review below documents. However, a number of them focus on one country only, such as Gumpert, Hines, and Schnitzer (2016) on Germany or Zucman (2014) on the United States. Indeed, one of our contributions to the literature is that we develop estimates for a wide range of countries -in practice for all countries for which we have available data. We see this also as a contribution to international policy debates, since there is only a limited number of similar estimates for as many countries and we make a comparison with the three that do exist.
We also contribute to the study of the heterogeneous impacts of international corporate tax avoidance. So far, most research looks at individual countries or, in the case of international focus, often focuses only on the division between the developing and developed countries. For example, Fuest, Hebous, & Riedel (2011) find that the effect of the host country corporate tax rate on the debt ratio of multinational affiliates in developing economies is larger than for affiliates in developed economies.
Similar division is used also by Johannesen, Tørsløv, and Wier (2017) , who link the tax aggressiveness of MNEs with the economic development of their host countries, but they also estimate models that exploit the cross-country variation in economic and institutional development. This more granular approach is needed and similar studies should reflect the country-specific characteristics. Indeed, we perform our regression analysis using regional and income groups and carry out the rest of the estimation at the country level at which we also present the results and discuss their implications for differences in profit shifting effects across income groups.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin with a literature review of previous similar estimates in Section 2 and an overview of the data used and basic descriptive statistics in Section 3. We describe our empirical methodology in Section 4 and we present the detailed results in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion of the implications of the results and concludes.
Literature review
In this section, we first discuss the main channels through which MNEs may effectively shift profits out of high-tax jurisdictions and explore which of these channels could be quantified using the available data. Second, we briefly review recent literature related to the quantification of corporate profit shifting and the resulting tax revenue losses. Third, we sum up the results of a pioneering report on whose FDIdriven approach we build in this paper. Lastly and before moving to the data description, we discuss the pros and cons of the data sets used most often in similar research and used in this paper. For the sake of space, we provide only a brief literature review in which we focus on the research most relevant for our paper and for more comprehensive reviews of academic literature on profit shifting we refer to Dharmapala (2014) , Clausing (2016) or Dowd, Landefeld, and Moore (2017) .
Three main profit shifting channels are recognized in the literature: debt shifting, location of intangible assets, and strategic transfer pricing. Naturally, all three are motivated by the MNEs' assumed desire to reduce their total amount of tax liabilities by artificially shifting their profits and assets and thus tax bases to countries with lower (effective) tax rates, sometimes referred to as tax havens. First, in the case of debt shifting channel, MNEs implement unnecessary loans at high interest rates from one MNE affiliate located in a low-tax jurisdiction to another profitable unit located elsewhere (Buettner and Wamser 2013; Desai 2005; Fuest, Hebous, and Riedel 2011; Huizinga and Laeven 2008) . Second, intangible assets and intellectual property such as brands or research and development can be stationed artificially at a subsidiary in a tax haven, to which service fees are then paid by other parts of the MNE (Dischinger & Riedel 2011; Bryan et al. 2017; Seabrooke & Wigan 2015; Taylor et al. 2015) . As reflected in (OECD 2017) , pricing such intangible assets poses several major challenges, making it intrinsically difficult to disentangle profit shifting effects from actual prices. The third main channel for profit shifting is to inflate or deflate the prices of goods or services being transferred between the various foreign parts of an MNE in such a way as to minimize the tax burden faced in all the countries put together (Clausing 2003; Bartelsman & Beetsma 2003; Peralta et al. 2006; Davies et al. 2014 ).
The quantitative evidence of MNEs shifting profits and debt and locating their headquarters or intellectual property in such a way as to avoid taxes is substantial. As outlined above, a number of studies have provided evidence of profit shifting, especially on how tax rate differentials affect reported pre-tax profits, and on the strategies MNEs employ to reallocate profits within their groups. A range of studies analyzed how reported income changes with respect to tax rate differences across countries, represented by Hines Jr & Rice (1994), Huizinga & Laeven (2008) and Dharmapala & Riedel (2013) We naturally build on a range of existing research in this as in any other research paper, but here we build upon one specific source more than others. UNCTAD (2015) in their World Investment Report estimate tax revenue losses related to inward investment stocks as directly linked to offshore hubs, focusing specifically on developing countries. They develop and estimate a foreign direct investmentdriven approach to measuring the scale and economic impact of tax avoidance schemes that require a direct investment link. Their investment perspective on tax avoidance puts the spotlight on the role of offshore investment hubs as major global investment players. They estimate that some 30 percent of cross-border corporate investment stocks are routed through offshore hubs before they reach their destination as productive assets. Their preferred estimate of annual revenue losses for developing countries, the focus of their study, is 90 billion USD; extending that estimate globally results in 8% of corporate income tax and USD 200 billion lost in government revenue in 2012. In this paper, we review their methodology and then extend it to help us better answer our research question. Moreover, using updated data sources, we report the results at country level and discuss the resulting distributional impacts of profit shifting. Other than this one or Akkermans (2017) , we understand that the recent related existing research, does not too often use country-level FDI statistics, which, however, does have an important comparative advantage of better coverage of countries that we make use of in this paper.
What much of the recent profit shifting studies aiming for a world coverage, including Fuest, Hebous, & Johannesen, Tørsløv, and Wier (2017) , use is Orbis, the largest commercially-available database of company balance sheets. One of the advantages of Orbis is that it contains details that enable researchers to produce rigorous estimates about various profit shifting channels such as the choice of patent location within MNEs, as documented by Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) . Orbis, however, does have its quite well-known substantive shortcomings, in addition to being available only to subscribers. It suffers from a country selection bias with some countries' companies being more likely to be represented than others. Clausing (2016) argues that Orbis includes extremely limited information for tax havens and an analysis based on the data thus excludes many of the observations that drive most of the income shifting behaviour. Cobham and Loretz (2014) and KalemliOzcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015) document that the coverage is severely limited among developing countries. Therefore, as recently acknowledged by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) while identifying offshore financial centres, the Orbis data is biased against tax havens and developing countries, both groups of countries obviously crucial for research such as ours. Instead of Orbis, we use country-level FDI statistics described below. On the one hand, the level of granularity of FDI data remains much lower than that of Orbis and some concerns about data quality remains, especially when the data is reported by tax havens. On the other hand, coverage of both tax havens and developing countries is what makes FDI data superior to Orbis for our purposes. All in all, we believe that both Orbis and country-level FDI data sets should be used for research of profit shifting and that their results can complement each other well. Given the better coverage, our FDI-data driven approach is apt for estimating the global distribution of scale of profit shifting and of tax revenue losses.
Data
The methodology relies on country-level foreign direct investment data. First and most important, we use data on FDI stocks on a bilateral level from the IMF's Coordinated Direct Investment Survey -from offshore financial centers (OFCs) and other countries; we explain this classification in detail in the following section. We observe that the increase in total FDI stock was caused by investment from both OFC countries and other countries.
The other important data required for our methodology is FDI income, which we source from the IMF's Balance of Payments data. (Specifically, for FDI income we use the variable called "Current Account, Primary Income, Investment Income, Direct Investment, Debit, USD (BMIPID_BP6_USD)".)
We compute the rates of return on foreign direct investment as shares of FDI income on total FDI stocks in each country. We see at least three potential drawbacks of this step. First, while investment from different countries may yield different returns across countries, the FDI income data are only available at country level (and not at a bilateral level), which hides some of the information that could potentially be used to obtain better estimates of the size of corporate profit shifting. Second, the sources (for FDI income and FDI stocks) are combined into a single number (rate of return on FDI), but may potentially be using slightly inconsistent methodologies as to what is classified as FDI. Three, while we use rate of return on equity and rate of return on debt in addition to the overall rate of return, the equity and debt components are divided by the same overall FDI stock rather than the equity component and the debt component of the FDI stock. Despite these data limitations, we assume that using these sources is reflective of the true rate of return on FDI. In addition to FDI-related data, our methodological approach requires data sources that are auxiliary to the main analysis. These include data on corporate tax rates from KPMG and the World Bank (2016), lists of tax havens from various sources, and data on GDP from the World Bank, complemented by the CIA's World Factbook 4 . To present the estimate in relative terms to tax revenues, we use the recently introduced ICTD/WIDER Government Revenue Dataset, which boasts better quality data and country coverage and was introduced by Prichard et al. (2014) . 
Methodology
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy of how we estimate the scale of profit shifting.
Measuring the scale of profit shifting is intrinsically difficult and since the phenomenon is rarely directly observable, the existing methodological approaches aim to shed more light on certain aspects of profit shifting indirectly. We build on one such approach by UNCTAD (2015) and in this paper we develop it further to provide the answer to our research question of which countries' tax revenues are affected most by profit shifting. First, we describe how we closely follow their empirical strategy in a baseline model and, then, how we extend. We apply both in the following results section, but we prefer and further work with the estimates according to the improved methodology further used to shed light on cross-country distributional effects as we as to compare it with other similar studies. In both cases we begin by empirically testing whether a higher share of investment from offshore financial centres is associated with a lower reported rate of return on inward FDI. This is what we start this section with
and after this relationship is tested and assumed to be due to profit shifting, we describe how we estimate its scale and the resulting tax revenue losses. The final part of this section explains in detail how we design an indicator of a share of investment from offshore financial centres in total inward foreign direct investment in each country, used as an input in the first part.
We first describe how we test for the negative correlation between a share of offshore financial centre investment and rate of return on inward FDI. The hypothesis central to our analysis is that a higher share of offshore financial centre investment is associated with a higher volume of profit shifting practices, resulting in an artificially deflated reported rate of return. In the baseline model, the regression to be estimated using OLS with regional-and time-fixed effects is:
where is the rate of return on investment in country in year , is the offshore indicator, , are year-fixed effects and , are regional fixed effects based on World Bank classifications. The rationale behind using regional fixed effects is that some regions share common characteristics that have significant effects on both the explanatory and the dependent variable. To ensure the comparability of our results to those reached by UNCTAD (2015) , the regression model is estimated using the same list of 72 countries, but include additional data for 2013-2015 and thus increase the sample from 265 to 477 observations. We estimate the model for all countries as well as separately for two groups, for developing and developed countries, and for three alternatives for the dependent variable -rate of return, rate of return on equity and rate of return on debt. While we hypothesise a negative relationship for rate of return and rate of return on equity, we expect a positive relationship for the debt component of the FDI rate of return since the debt component is composed primarily of interest paid by the foreign affiliates to the parent, which is, in fact, a cost for the affiliates and thus an element that actually erodes the taxable base. Therefore, we include the estimation for the debt component for the sake of completeness, but we focus on models that use the equity component of the rate of return or the rate of return itself.
We propose an extended model: by income. Specifically, we add controls for income groups in our model, using a dummy variable in the full-sample regression rather than splitting the sample for developing and developed countries and performing the regressions separately. Second, our model allows for effects that are heterogeneous across regions and income groups to influence the relationship between the offshore indicator and rate of return. This is enabled by the fact that we include not only dummy variables for income groups, regions and years, but also interaction terms for income groups and regions. The regional and incomegroup effects are thus implicitly divided into those that affect the examined relationship and those that do not. The rationale behind this is that the countries within these groups share some common characteristics that have a specific effect on the behaviour of the MNEs that route their investment through offshore financial centres. Our approach enables capturing these common effects and this innovation is instrumental for the derivation of country-level results. A first-best model might be one that includes country-level fixed effects, however, the low levels of variation of inward investment stock and rate of return on these investments prevent a country-fixed effects model from having enough explanatory power. Third, we estimate the country-level results using specific corporate tax rates for each country rather than one estimate for all countries. This, together with the inherent fixed-effects heterogeneity, yields more accurate results at the country level. Fourth, our sample covers not only a longer time period, but also a larger number of countries 6 , bringing the total number of observations included in our headline extended model to 509, compared to 265 used by UNCTAD (2015).
While these innovations improve on the baseline model, some concerns and a need for assumptions remain and we discuss them here. For example, an MNE may decide to route the investment through an OFC because the destination country has an inefficient financial sector. As a result, the low level of financial development causes a lower rate of return (i.e. low financial development, less sources of local financing for the foreign affiliate and so lower rate of return) and a higher offshore indicator (the MNE has to route the investment through the OFC in order to efficiently finance its foreign affiliate). More generally, due to potential endogeneity problems, we do not aim to establish a causality in the relationship between the two variables but focus instead on the correlation between them across countries, income and regional groups. Unfortunately, data on bilateral foreign direct investment are only available at country, rather than industry or firm level, which prevents further improvement in the precision of estimation of the relationship between the offshore indicator and the rate of return on FDI.
There thus remain some concerns about, for example, potentially more profitable investment being routed more through offshore hubs, which would make our estimates biased upward. Conversely, investment into developing countries may be more likely to be routed through offshore hubs, but may also be likely to yield higher profits, which would make our estimates biased downward.
Furthermore, even if we observe a statistically significant negative relationship between offshore investment and rate of return, it is only evidence consistent with profit shifting and, of course, it does not necessarily imply that profit shifting is responsible for all or much or even any part of the observed relationship. As is the case with similar relationships, such correlation might be a spurious one or explained by some not included or unobserved variable or some other endogeneity issue. There does not seem to be a credible way to establish to what extent the correlation is driven by profit shifting. Instead, we assume that it is so. We make this important assumption mostly on the basis of the underlying logic, i.e. that the profits are lower as a consequence of being shifted to offshore financial centres, that the origin of FDI should not significantly affect the actual profitability of the foreign affiliate, and existing evidence that profit shifting is indeed an important phenomenon presented by other studies, including those discussed in the literature review. For this assumption, we can consider the estimates an upper bound for the effects of profit shifting since we assume that only profit shifting is responsible for all of the observed relationship. On the other hand, another implication of this methodology is that of all the various schemes used to shift profit, we estimate only those require a direct investment link. For example, trade mispricing is not accounted for in our estimates since it does not require a direct investment link. These estimates thus do not include the full effects of international corporate tax avoidance and may in this respect be viewed as a lower bound estimates of the overall profit shifting.
Once we make this assumption, we can estimate how much profit is shifted and what is the associated tax revenue loss for the affected countries. Specifically, to arrive at an estimate of the scale of shifted profits we multiply the actual amount of offshore investment, given by multiplying the FDI stock and an offshore indicator, with the responsiveness of reported rate of return on offshore investment, a parameter estimated by the regression above. And to arrive at an estimate of the associated tax loss, we transform the shifted profits to pre-tax values and multiply it by the relevant tax rate. For the baseline model we do so in the same straightforward way as UNCTAD (2015), considering average rather than country-specific values for FDI stock, a share of FDI from offshore financial centers and a tax rate. 7 In contrast, for the extended model we do use the country-specific values for these variables whenever available and make. These estimations are implicitly underpinned by a number of other assumptions, such as assuming that the shifted profits would be liable to corporate income taxation and at what rate. So, of course, the important assumption discussed above together with these additional assumptions imply that we should be careful when interpreting and using these, indeed, only illustrative estimates of profit shifting.
We now return to explaining how we define how much offshore investment each country receives. In constructing a so called offshore indicator, defined for each country as a ratio of inward FDI from offshore financial centres, we identify the offshore financial centres in three categories. In this we follow UNCTAD (2015) and the advantage is being consistent and thus comparable with their earlier results. We acknowledge that this method partly relies on somewhat arbitrary decisions about the criteria for the dichotomous selection of offshore financial centres, criticised for example by Cobham, Janský, and Meinzer (2015) . Indeed, we would prefer to use a continuous measure that does not rely on binary criteria for all three groups; however, as of our knowledge, there is currently no such one measure for offshore investments and the three groups used here at least combine binary with continuous measures.
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The first group is a list of 38 tax havens compiled by UNCTAD (2015) based on OECD's (2000) initial list of 41 jurisdictions. 9 The whole stock of investment from these jurisdictions is considered as offshore investment. The second is a group of so-called self-declared Special Purpose Entity (SPE) countries. A SPE is an institutional unit that provides financial services to MNEs which allow it to transfer funds through a jurisdiction. These entities are sometimes called pass-through units or shell companies because the financial flows administered by these entities do not correspond to their actual economic activities in the SPEs' country of incorporation (OECD 2015 . The difference between the actual FDI stock and the predicted FDI stock is then accounted towards the offshore indicator. Combined, the three categories contribute to how much each country receives in inward FDI from offshore financial centres relative to all of its inward FDI. This feeds into the regression at the methodology's start and with it we also begin the discussion of results.
Results
We present the results in this section. First, we present estimates of the baseline model using updated data sources. Second, we show estimates of the newly developed extended model and present the country-level estimates for the first time. Third, we compare our results with the few other similar studies and highlight their relevance for the cross-country distributional impact of international corporate profit shifting.
We begin with the results of the estimation of the baseline model in Table A1 in the Appendix . For both the rate of return and its equity component we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the offshore indicator and the rate of return on FDI stock using the full sample of countries, with larger and statistically significant coefficients for the sample of developing countries only and with no statistically significant effect for developed countries. Our longer data series improves the explanatory power of the model and suggests slightly smaller coefficients in absolute value than the 10 In future research the selection process for classifying countries into this group may thus potentially be improved by using newly available data from other countries' central banks. 11 Based on 2012 data, 26 countries comply with the first criterion and 12 with the second, the intersection of which results in 6 countries falling into the other SPE countries category. Out of these, Hungary, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were already included in the self-declared SPE countries category, so that only the remaining three countries fall into the other SPEs group (Hong Kong, Ireland and Singapore).
original results reached by UNCTAD (2015) . Positive and statistically significant coefficients obtained for the model that uses the debt component of the FDI rate of return are in line with the notion that the debt component is composed primarily of interest paid by the foreign affiliates to the parent, which is, in fact, a cost for the affiliates and thus an element that actually erodes the taxable base. In the remaining part of our analysis, including the extended model, we focus only on models that use the equity component of the rate of return or the rate of return itself.
We now derive the estimate of the scale of profit shifting assuming that the observed negative relationship between the share of offshore investment and the rate of return on FDI can be attributed to profit shifting. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes the numbers for 2015. We use information on the total global exposure to offshore hub investment reached (41.5 % for all, 52 % for developing and 37 % for developed countries) and the total reported FDI stock (19.57 trillion USD for all, 6.37 trillion USD for developing and 13.19 trillion USD for developed countries). One option is to use the regression estimates for all countries from Table A1 . In that way we arrive at a global estimate of 126 and 178 billion USD lost in tax revenues in 2015, using the rate of return and its equity component only, respectively. While the obvious advantage of this option is to have the estimates of tax losses for all countries (except for tax havens, of course), a drawback of this model is that it averages out significant amounts of heterogeneity across countries. Therefore, we consider more granular options, starting with the one that divides the sample into two groups of developing and developed countries. Our results for 2015, presented in detail in Table A2 in For the extended model, we begin with the regression results in Table 4 . As in the baseline model, we use three specifications that differ in their dependent variable. In line with the hypotheses outlined above, we observe a statistically significant, negative relationship between the offshore indicator and the first two dependent variables and a lower coefficient for the debt component of the rate of return.
Importantly, the regressions include controls for income-, region-and year-fixed effects. The combinations of coefficients for the two classifications result in estimates presented in Table 5 . We leave out those the few combinations that are not statistically significantly different from zero. 13 We also exclude from further analysis countries in those region-income groups for which the estimated profitability gap is positive, since we focus on estimated losses only and, similarly, we do not investigate the potential tax gains by tax havens. 14 Our extended approach takes advantage of the inclusion of region-and income-fixed effects and exploits the heterogeneity in the relationship between the rate of return and the offshore indicator across combinations of these classifications, thereby providing a more country-specific and thus precise estimate of the relationship for individual countries. We use these estimates in the following section to compute estimated tax revenue losses at the country level. This approach allows to estimate tax revenue losses for a group of 118 countries that have data on FDI stocks available.
To derive estimates of tax revenue losses at country level, we follow the steps as applied above for the baseline model, but with information specific for each country on the actual offshore hub exposure and nominal corporate tax rates. Where those are missing, we input the average values in the respective region-income group -at the cost of some degree of imprecision but with the objective to obtain estimates for as many countries as possible despite data limitations. In total, we obtain country level results of positive tax revenue losses for 93 countries. If we sum up these country-specific estimates, the total global tax revenue losses amount to 67 and 71 billion USD. We present these country-level estimates for all countries in Table A3 in the Appendix and in Figure 3 that shows the share of total tax revenue losses on the total GDP by income and region groups. Unfortunately, the relatively short panel of observations and low variability over time prevents the use of country-fixed effects and as a consequence we use the income-region groups instead. Therefore the differences between countries within the income-region groups are driven by the heterogeneity in FDI stock, offshore exposure and tax rates, whereas the differentiated regression estimates also contribute to the differences across countries from different income-region groups. In Figure 4 we present our estimates as shares of corporate tax revenue for all countries in our sample that have data on corporate tax revenue available. They suggest that significant shares of corporate tax revenue is foregone by some countries due to profit shifting, with lower-income countries again losing higher shares of corporate tax revenue in relative terms. The correlation between GDP per capita and tax revenue losses as shares of corporate tax revenue reaches -0.38, underlining our previous results. We find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that lower-income countries lose more tax revenue in relative terms than higher-income countries. For low-income, lower middle-income, and upper middleincome countries, we estimate the total tax revenue losses due to profit shifting at 0.24%, 0.49% and 0.67% of GDP, respectively, which can be considered substantial amounts. Clausing (2016) , who focus only on US-headquartered MNEs. All four sets of estimates have a different methodology, sample and scope, making a direct comparison difficult. In order to analyse disparities between the relative losses of different income groups, we compute the share of each income group on the total estimated tax revenue losses resulting from profit shifting. Figure A1 shows the share of each income group on the total tax revenue losses as estimated by the four studies.
Since these are absolute numbers, it is not surprising that the loss of higher income economies accounts for the bulk of global tax revenue losses. Moreover, lower-income countries are strongly underrepresented in the samples of the three above mentioned studies, a drawback on which our results improve significantly. Figure A2 puts these numbers into perspective by showing the estimated tax revenue losses as weighted shares of GDP rather than absolute numbers. Although on different scales and magnitudes, the four studies point to a similar pattern that in relative terms, the tax revenues of lower-income countries are hurt more than those of higher-income countries. Cobham & Janský (2017a) , Cobham & Janský (2017b) and Clausing (2016) .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on quantifying the scale of one particular aspect of international corporate tax avoidance -profit shifting related to foreign direct investment. We began by closely following the methodology of one of the leading works in the area by UNCTAD (2015) in what we call a baseline model, using new data to obtain updated estimates. We reach similar results, with a global estimate of lost tax revenue of around 200 billion USD, roughly evenly divided between developing and developed countries, with the former incurring much more significant losses in relative terms.
We then proceeded to extend the baseline model in three major ways. First, we have used a more sensitive classification of countries by regional and income groups. Second, our model implicitly divides the regional and income-group effects into those that affect the examined relationship and those that do not. The rationale behind this is that countries within these groups share some common characteristics that have a specific effect on the behaviour of the MNEs that route their investment through offshore hubs. Our approach has enabled us to capture these effects. Third, we have estimated the country-level results using specific corporate tax rates and shares of offshore hub FDI for each country rather than using averages for the whole sample. This, together with the inherent fixed-effects heterogeneity, yields more accurate results at the country level.
We find that lower-income countries lose significantly more revenue in relative terms than higherincome countries, a force that works toward widening the gap between rich and poor countries rather than diminishing it. At the same time, lower-income countries are those that are relatively less able to implement effective tools that would reduce the scale of profit shifting out of their countries. Our work thus provides further corroboration on the importance of initiatives such as the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting framework for the tax revenues developing countries so desperately need.
We provide a direct comparison of our estimates with the ones reached by Cobham and Janský (2017a) , Cobham and Janský (2017b) and Clausing (2016) and observe that in general, these studies are in support of our results, confirming the hypothesis that lower-income countries lose significantly more tax revenue in relative terms than higher-income countries. Our estimates are lower in magnitude as compared to the mentioned studies, which is consistent with the fact that our method only exploits profit shifting practices that require a direct investment link (and thus underestimates in this respect the true scale of corporate profit shifting).
Several limitations of the used approach persist. First, we have observed a statistically significant negative relationship between the share of inward investment stock originating from offshore investment hubs and the rate of return for developing countries, and in our extended model also for other countries.
We believe that this relationship can be attributed in part to missing profits due to profit shifting. However, we are not able to estimate how large a part of this is due to profit shifting and due to other reasons for lower profitability. Furthermore, our approach does not provide an insight on what the likely channels of profit shifting associated with the lower returns might be, and it is clear that this methodological approach only estimates those international corporate tax avoidance schemes that require a direct investment relationship through equity or debt, and not other possible means of international corporate tax avoidance.
In addition to addressing these limitations, it would be desirable for further research to focus on the role of various assumptions, including those about tax rates -perhaps using average effective tax rates -and on the definition of offshore investment hubs, maybe applying various sets of definitions as a robustness check and as a means of learning about which havens are responsible for the estimated revenue losses. An alternative approach to the definition of offshore investment hubs could be to focus, rather than on dichotomous classifications of tax havens, on continuous measures of tax havenry, such as Tax Justice Network's Financial Secrecy Index. Source: Authors' construction, UNCTAD (2015) . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
